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Abstract. Spectral decomposition has been rarely used to investigate complex
networks. In this work we apply this concept in order to define two types of link-
directed attacks while quantifying their respective effects on the topology. Several
other types of more traditional attacks are also adopted and compared. These attacks
had substantially diverse effects, depending on each specific network (models and real-
world structures). It is also showed that the spectral-based attacks have special effect
in affecting the transitivity of the networks.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 89.75.Hc, 89.20.-a
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The theory of graphs (e.g. [1]) and networks (e.g. [2, 3]) represents one of the
most multidisciplinary, integrated and applicable areas of theoretical mathematics and
computing. Although its origin is often traced back to Euler’s solution of the Ko¨nigsberg
bridge problem, graphs have been around for much longer, at least since the first map
was draw on sand ‡. Because graphs and networks can represent most discrete structures
possibly underlying dynamical systems [3, 4], they are particularly useful for modeling a
vast range of problems. The identification of structured connections in growing graphs,
especially the existence of hubs and their fundamental importance (e.g. [2]), helped to
catalyse a surge of interest which had already been sparkled by random graphs and
small world networks studies, giving rise to the new theory of complex networks.
A good deal of the investigations in complex networks have focused on relatively
simple properties such as the node degree (i.e. the number of connections established
by a node), clustering coefficient (i.e. the degree of interconnectivity among the
immediate neighbors of a node) and the shortest path length between two nodes.
These measurements[5] are particularly important because they correspond to the
distinguishing features of the main complex network models. For instance, small
world networks are characterized by low mean shortest path length together with high
clustering coefficient, and scale free networks exhibit power law degree distributions.
However, as these measurements are not enough to provide a complete, invertible,
representation of the complex network of interest, they will not be enough to directly
express many important connectivity properties.
There are so many possible measurements of complex networks that it is useful to
organize them into categories (e.g. [5]). A particular interesting and useful category
of measurements are those called spectral (e.g. [6, 7, 8]), in the sense of involving the
eigenvalues of the adjacency matrices of the analyzed graphs. Spectral approaches to
graphs and networks are particularly important because of many reasons including the
relationship between eigenvalues and the dynamics of the network, connectedness, cuts,
modularity and cycles, among others. Such concepts and methods have progressively
attracted the attention from the complex networks community, to the extent that some
of the best community finding algorithms in this area are now based on spectral methods
(e.g. [9]).
Spectral approaches in graphs, have many relationships with theoretical and applied
physics, they may consider the adjacency (e.g. [6, 8]) or Laplacian matrices (e.g. [7]) of
graphs. In this work we concentrate attention in the former type of approaches. More
specifically, because the spectrum of a graph does not provide a complete representation,
we focus our attention on the possibility to use the eigenspaces of graphs [8] in order
to derived more powerful features for characterizing the graph connectivity. Complete
representations are important in graph studies because they allow a one to one mapping
between any graph (including its isomorphisms) into a feature space which can be used
‡ Maps are a special kind of graph called geographical, which is characterized by the fact that the edges
have well-defined positions in an embedding space.
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for unambiguous graph classification (e.g. [5]), avoiding degenerate mappings §. While
any graph can be precise and completely represented in terms of its spectrum and
eigenspaces, such formulation ultimately depends on the node labeling for the correct
identification of the eigenspaces. Therefore, such a representation is not invariant to
node label permutations and graph isomorphisms. While the existence of a complete
and invariant representation of graphs does not seem to be likely (e.g. [8]), it is still
interesting to consider additional features rather than just the graph spectrum. One
of the most natural such a complementation can be achieved by considering also the
eigenspaces of the graphs.
We consider here the problem of quantifying the importance of links in networks
using the spectral decomposition of the adjacency matrix. Based on link spectral
measurements that are described below, a fraction of the links is removed and the
effect of this removal on network topology is quantified for some specific model or real
networks. For comparison’s sake, the same procedure is also applied using other, non-
spectral, link measurements. There are many works dealing with vulnerability of model
and real networks to attacks on nodes or links [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Those works do
not use spectral measurements. Spectral techniques are often used to express centrality
measures of nodes [17] and for community detection [9, 18, 19], but were also used
for the network vulnerability problem [20, 21, 22]. None of these works used spectral
decomposition. Spectral decomposition is used in Ref. [23], where the authors consider
the problem of reconstructing a network after perturbation.
This article is organized as follows. First, the basic concepts from complex network
(e.g. [2, 3, 4, 5]) and eingenspace (e.g. [6, 8]) theories are presented in an introductory
and self-contained way. Then the experimental methodology is explained regarding the
generation of the synthetic complex network models and measurements used for the
evaluation, which is followed by the presentation and discussion of the results.
1. Basic Concepts
A graph (or complex network) Γ = (V,E) is a discrete structure composed by a set of
vertices or nodes V and a set of edges or links E, with N = |V | and L = |E| ‖. We
henceforth assume that the nodes of such a graph are labelled with successive positive
integer values, i.e. 1, 2, . . . , N , and that multiple or self-connections are not present.
The existence of an edge extending from node i to node j is indicated, in the case
of undirected graphs considered here, by the unordered pair (i, j). A graph can be
completely specified in terms of its adjacency matrix A of dimension N × N . The
presence of the edge (i, j) is indicated as Aij = Aji = 1; otherwise Aij = Aji = 0. Note
that the trace of A is zero. A graph is said to be connected in case any node can be
§ In a degenerate mapping, two or more different graphs can be mapped into the same representation,
precluding the map inversion. Degenerate mappings are frequently used for network characterization
and classification.
‖ The operation |X | stands for the cardinality of the set X , i.e. its number of elements.
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reached from any other node while moving through the edges of the graph. The sequence
of nodes (or edges) visited during such movements is called a path of the graph, with
length equal to the number of involved edges.
The characteristic polynomial of the adjacency matrix A is given as PΓ(λ) =
det(λI − A). The eigenvalues of A, assumed to be sorted and represented as λ1 ≥
λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λN , correspond to the zeros of PΓ(λ). Because the graph is undirected, A
is symmetric, implying real eigenvalues. Each of these eigenvalues is a solution of the
equation Avi = λivi for a non-zero vector vi called the eigenvector associated with λi.
The set of the N eigenvalues is called the spectrum of Γ. The largest eigenvalue λ1 of a
graph Γ is the index of Γ. In a connected graph, the eigenvector associated to the index
has all its elements positive and is called the principal eigenvector of Γ.
Because the adjacency matrices obtained by changes of the labels of the nodes are
similar (and the graphs isomorphic), the spectrum of a graph does not depend on the
node labeling and is therefore an invariant to label permutations. Note that, unlike
eigenvalues, eigenvectors are not invariant to label permutations.
The original adjacency matrix can be expressed in terms of its spectral decomposition
given as
A =
N∑
i=1
λiSi, (1)
where Si = viv
T
i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
It follows immediately from Equation (1) that a graph can be completely specified
in terms of its spectrum and eigenvectors.
2. Evaluation methodology
General insight We use the entry in line i, column j of some components of the spectral
decomposition of the adjacency matrix as an indication of the “importance” of the link
between nodes i and j. If all components are included, the adjacency matrix is recovered,
and the importance is equal to 1 for all the links. We need to choose some components,
with two possibilities presenting themselves: specifying a fixed number of the most
important eigencomponents or specifying a threshold, including all components with
eigenvalue above the threshold. We consider a simple case of each of these possibilities:
• The component corresponding to the largest eigenvalue, here called the largest
eigencomponent, that is, the matrix given by
λ1S1 (2)
as in Equation Equation (1).
• The sum of the contribution of all positive eigenvalues in Equation Equation (1),
here called positive eigencomponent :
∑
i,λi>0
λiSi. (3)
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Evaluation To compare different “importance” measurements we compute them for
the same network and subsequently attack a fraction of the most important links in the
network according to each measurement. The link “importance” measurement whose
attack yields the most significant impact on the network structure (as evaluated by some
network measurements) is considered the most effective.
Networks used We used three network models and two real-world networks. The
models used are:
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) Used as a null model.
Baraba´si-Albert (BA) Chosen because of the presence of hubs.
Watts-Strogatz (WS) A network model with high clustering.
Holme-Kim (HK) The growing scale-free network model with finite transitivity
proposed by Holme and Kim [24].
The real-world networks used are the US Airports and the US Power Grid networks,
both from the Pajek datasets [25]. These networks were chosen because the attacks to
their links have a clear meaning.
Measurements We use two kinds of measurements: the ones used to rank the links and
the ones used to evaluate network topology.
Link ranking We propose that the “importance” of link (i, j) be taken as the entry
in row i, column j of the matrices defined by Equations Equation (2) and Equation (3).
For comparison, we evaluate also the following possibilities:
Betweenness centrality of the link.
Degree product corresponds to the product of the degrees of the nodes at both ends
of the link. This measurement was also used in Ref. [26].
Random walk centrality, computed as the fraction of steps of random walkers started
at random nodes that pass through the link. We used 10N random walkers (N is
the number of nodes in the network), each one with 100 steps.
Number of triangles The number of triangles [sets of links of the kind
(i, j), (j, k), (k, i) including the link.
Random order, that is, nodes are attacked at random.
Network topology To evaluate the network topology, we consider the following
measurements:
Transitivity (sometimes called also clustering coefficient) is a simple example of a
measurement of local network connectivity.
Average path length This measurement, also called distance, help quantify how the
accessibility of nodes is being affected by the attack.
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Largest degree Looking at the largest degree in the network we can evaluate the effect
of the attack in the most important hubs.
Number of clusters As the links are removed, the network breaks in independent
clusters. The number of cluster gives a measure of the fractioning of the network.
Largest cluster The size of the largest cluster, measured as the fraction of nodes in
this cluster.
Number of squares The number of squares [sets of links of the kind (i, j), (j, k), (k, l), (l, i),
for distinct nodes i, j, k, l] including the link.
Attack An attack using a given link measurement is simulated by the following
procedure: First the measurement is computed for each link; the links are then ranked
from largest to smallest value, and a given fraction of the links with the largest values
is removed from the network. Finally, network measurements are computed for the
attacked network.
3. Results and Discussion
The experiments were run using networks of 1000 nodes and average degree 4. For
Watts-Strogatz networks a rewiring probability of 0.05 was used; for the Holme-Kim
networks, the probability of a triad formation step is 0.8. The results are averages of 50
networks for each model.
The results for model networks are shown in Figures 1 (ER), 2 (BA), 3 (WS), and
4 (HK). For real networks, the results are shown in Figures 5 (US Airports) and 6 (US
Power grid).
Attacks directed by triangle count have mostly similar results as random attacks,
with the exception of the HK model and the US Airports network, where they tend
to break the network clusters and preserve the squares. The maximum degree is most
affected by attacks following the degree product, but also strongly affected by the largest
eigencomponent and betweenness.
Attacks by degree product have also strong effect in the average distances, but
other attacks have different effects on different topologies: for ER networks, betweenness
and positive eigencomponents have similar and important effects; for BA, betweenness
has almost the same effect than degree product and they are followed by the largest
eigencomponent, with other attacks fairing similarly to random attacks. For HK
networks, the results are similar to that for the BA networks, but betweenness is less
effective.
Without considering the ER and BA model, that have too small transitivity, we see
that the transitivity is reduced fast by attacks based on positive eigencomponents. The
effect of attacks based on random walk betweenness is not much different from random
attacks. The other attacks, specially by betweenness, increase the transitivity, i.e. they
tend to preserver triangles while edges are removed.
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The strongest effect on the clustering structure of the network is achieved by
attacks based on random walk betweenness or largest eigencomponent (for number of
clusters) and random walk betweenness and link betweenness (for size of the largest
cluster). For BA networks the positive eigencomponents attacks are as effective as
random walks, while for HK networks this happens with the largest eigencomponent
attacks. Other attacks are similar or less effective than random attacks, but note how
in attacks by product degreee, the positive and largest eigencomponents tend to preserve
the clustering structure of the airports network.
Attacks by degree product are the most effective to destroy squares in the studied
networks. On the other hand, attacks by random walk betweenness tend to preserve
links that take belong to squares. Link removal by betweenness centrality tends to
increase the average distances, while preserving the transitivity. Attacks guided by
the largest eigencomponent are specially effective to dismember the network in a large
number of clusters (with the exception of the airports network). When guided by the
positive eigencomponent, the attacks clearly destroy the transitivity of the network, but
their effect on other measurements is mixed and topology dependent. Degree product
can also be used in attacks to increase the average distances, and reduce the transitivity.
However their effect on other measurements, although distinct, changes from one type
of network to another.
There is also a curious behavior for the power grid network: for the number of
cluster, the largest eigencomponent is the most effective type of attack, while it has
smaller effect on the size of the largest cluster.
4. Concluding Remarks
Despite the increasing attention on the effects of complex network structure on
vulnerability to attacks, relatively little attention has been paid to spectral approaches.
In this work we reported an investigation where spectral decomposition of the adjacency
matrix is applied in order to direct the attacks, while the respective effects on the network
topology are identified. More specifically, we used the eigencomponent associated to
the highest eigenvalue and the sum of all positive eigenvalues. Several interesting
results were identified. The most definite verified effect is the sharp decrease of the
transitivity of the network implied by attacks guided by the largest eigencomponent.
This phenomenon has been found to be even stronger than attacks oriented to triangles.
The effect of the diverse types of attacks on the network topology depended largely
on the specific network types. For instance, the attacks by positive eigencomponents
had no effect in changing the number of clusters in the US Airport network, while
it implies a marked increase in the number of clusters in the case of the US Power
Grid network. In addition, the attacks by largest eigencomponents yielded the sharpest
increase of number of clusters in the WS model, while having less strong effects in
the other networks. Though spectral decomposition approach has seldom been used in
complex networks research, our results show that it is capable of emphasizing specific
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Figure 1. Effect of link attacks to some network measurements for Erdo˝s networks.
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Figure 2. Effect of link attacks to some network measurements for Baraba´si networks.
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Figure 3. Effect of link attacks to some network measurements for Watts-Strogatz
networks.
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Figure 4. Effect of link attacks to some network measurements for Holme-Kim
networks.
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Figure 5. Effect of link attacks to some network measurements for the US Airport
network.
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Figure 6. Effect of link attacks to some network measurements for the US Power
Grid network.
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aspects of the network topology. It is therefore expected that additional applications
could benefit from considering spectral decomposition.
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